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SHOULD STATES RATIFY THE PROTOCOL? 
PROCESS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE OPTIONAL 
PROTOCOL OF THE ICESCR 
 
Abstract:  
 
Proponents and opponents of ratification of the ICESCR¶V2SWLRQDO3URWRFROKDYHboth 
H[DJJHUDWHGWKHFRQVHTXHQFHVRIJLYLQJLQGLYLGXDOVD³SULYDWHULJKWRIVWDQGLQJ´EHIRUH
the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights.  But this article argues that, on 
balance, ratification should be encouraged.  Individuals will bring new and urgent issues 
to the international agenda, and the dialog will help to encourage a better sense of states¶
international legal obligations under the treaty.  The consequences for ESC rights are 
likely to be modestly positive, if outcomes under the OP of the ICCPR are any guide. 
Even states that already respect ESC rights in their domestic law should ratify, because 
there is a tendency, judging by the ratification behaviour relating to similar agreements, 
for states to emulate ratification practices of other states in their region.  Ratification will 
neither end deprivation nor damage the credibility of the international legal system.  It 
will be a modest step forward in consensus-formation of the meaning of ESC rights, 
which in turn is a positive step toward their ultimate provision.  
 
Publication information: 
Norwegian Journal of Human Rights 27:1, S. (spring 2009), 64-81. 
 
 BY BETH A. SIMMONS
* 
Three billion people on earth live on less that $2.50 per day.
1  Another billion live in the 
³LQIRUPDWLRQDJH´XQDEOHWRVLJQWKHLUQDPHRUWRUHDG
2 About half of humanity ± some 
2.6 billion people ± does not have access to basic sanitation. From these facts, it is hard to 
tell that we live in a world in which economic rights have been defined as human rights 
and enshrined in international law for over 60 years. It is also hard to tell from these facts 
that 86 per cent of the states in the world have ratified one or more international covenant 
that recognizes HDFKRIWKHLURZQFLWL]HQVLV³HQWLWOHGWRUHDOL]DWLRQ«RIWKHHFRQRPLF
social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his 
                                                 
* Director of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and Clarence Dillon Professor of 
International Affairs in the Department of Government, Harvard University. 
1  See World Development Indicators, 2008 located at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:21725423~pagePK:
64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html (visited 5 March 2009 ) 
2   UNICEF's  1999 6WDWHRIWKH:RUOG¶V&KLOGUHQ5HSRUWORFDWHGDWhttp://www.unicef.org/sowc99/ (visited 
9 March 2009 )  SHUVRQDOLW\´
 3  That there is a disconnect between the principle that human being have a 
right to satisfy basic human needs and reality is a gross understatement. 
 
The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights purports to address these basic human rights. On the 60
th anniversary of the  
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (and some 42 years after passage of a similar 
provision for civil and political rights), the United Nations General Assembly adopted 
language giving individuals the right to submit complaints of treaty violation by a State 
party to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights for their official view.  
The pURWRFROJLYHVLQGLYLGXDOVD³ULJKWRIVWDQGLQJ´EHIRUHthe Committee. Within some 
limits defined in the protocol, individuals would be able ± if their State agrees ± to ask the 
Committee for its view on whether their State has violated the ICESCR.  
But should States ratify? Yes, on balance, they should. The agreement will not produce 
mLUDFOHVIRUWKHZRUOG¶VGHSULYHGEXWLWGRHVJLYHWKHPDOLPLWHGRSSRUWXQLW\WRKROG
their political leaders accountable for their actions (and inaction) relating to social, 
economic, and cultural rights. Proponents and opponents of ratification have both 
exaggerated the consequences of this treaty. It will neither make a serious dent in the 
VWDWLVWLFVFLWHGLQWKHRSHQLQJSDUDJUDSKQRUZLOOLWFRQVWLWXWHD³WKUHDWWRWKHLQWHJULW\RI
WKHWUHDW\V\VWHP´
4  It may encourage some governments to take economic, social and 
cultural rights into account in their developmental and social planning. Governments who 
have ratified the ICESCR presumptively should be willing to accept review of their 
policies if their own citizens complain they are not living up to their treaty obligations.  
Those who already take these rights seriously should ratify as a model to encourage 
others to follow suit. On balance, States should accept enhanced accountability by giving 
the Committee the authority to render views on individXDOV¶FRPSODLQWV 
 
This essay develops consequentialist arguments for ratifying the ICESCR.  First, 
ratification may well help to clarify an important obligation that states have under 
international law: what constitutes a violation of the ICESCR.   Legal clarity arguably 
improves implementation and compliance. Second, the availability of an individual 
complaint mechanism may have positive consequences ± at the margins ± for rights 
realization. My argument here is not strictly legal; it is social and political. New evidence 
on human rights treaty effects suggests that ratification of agreements has consequences 
in domestic politics, mobilizing publics to view their rights and roles in new ways, 
focusing and legitimating demands, and creating new possibilities for domestic 
coalitions.
5 Furthermore, what little evidence we have on mechanisms for an individual 
right of complaint internationally does seem to suggest that they are associated with 
                                                 
3   See especially Article 22 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. 
A/810AT 71(1948).   
4  Michael Dennis and David P SteZDUWµJusticiability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Should 
There Be an International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing and 
+HDOWK"¶American Journal of International Law ,pp 462-515, quoting from Phillip Philip Alston 
DQG*HUDUG4XLQQµ7KH1DWXUHDQG6FRSHRI6WDWHV3DUWLHV
2EOLJDWLRQVXQGHUWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RYHQDQW
RQ(FRQRPLF6RFLDODQG&XOWXUDO5LJKWV¶Human Rights Quarterly, pp156-229. 
5  Beth Simmons, : Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics. New York: 
Cambridge University Press ((forthcoming)). 
 rights improvements; at least, I will show, this has been the case with the Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). While we 
need to be cautious in interpreting the evidence, and especially inferring an ironclad 
causal relationship, the possibility that an individual right of standing before a body of 
experts helps improve rights outcomes on average provides a strong rationale for 
ratification.  Third and finally, States should ratify because it will encourage others to do 
so.  Ratification of international legal agreemeQWVLVWRVRPHH[WHQW³FRQWDJLRXV´,ZLOO
demonstrate this effect with respect to the individual complaint mechanisms of three 
other human rights treaties. States tend to ratify optional protocols when their 
neighboring peers do so.  Modest peer pressure will in time encourage others to ratify and 
broaden the access of individuals to an authoritative interpretation of their economic, 
social and cultural rights.  These are all good reasons, on balance, for States to ratify the 
Optional Protocol passed by consensus by the General Assembly in December 2008. 
 
I.  ENHANCING LEGAL CLARITY: FROM ABSTRACT PRINCIPLES TO CONCRETE CASES 
 
Economic and social rights have been part of the legal landscape for quite some time, yet 
there is still a good deal of uncertainty about their boundaries and when and how they 
might be enforced.  A small fraction of the existing constitutions prior to the 1950s had 
provisions for equal pay for equal work, a right to join a trade union and to strike, a right 
to rest and leisure, and a right to an adequate standard of living (see Figure 1).  An even 
smaller proportion contained a right to shelter, and various provisions relating to a right 
to health care (see Figure 2). Moreover, thirty-WKUHHVWDWHV¶FRQVWLWXWLRQVGLUHFWO\DQG
explicitly incorporate the UDHR into their basic law;
6 while ILYHFRXQWULHV¶FRQVWLWXWLRQV
explicitly incorporate the ICESCR
7.  It is interesting to note that the proportion of 
national constitutions containing economic and social rights has increased shortly after 
the international adoption of a major convention. This is especially true in the late 1940s 
± as well as the mid-1960s ± again, coinciding closely with the adoption and opening for 
signature of the ICESCR.  The post-Cold War wave of constitution-drafting in Latin 
America and Eastern Europe also saw a increase in the adoption of domestic ECS rights.  
A few countries in Asia and Africa ± notably, Indonesia and South Africa ± adopted some 
similar constitutional provisions as well. (Figure 2).   
 
[FIGURE 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                 
6 Afghanistan, 1977, 2004; Andorra, 1993; Angola, 1975; Benin, 1979; Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1995; Burkina 
Faso (Upper Volta), 1960, 1991; Burundi, 1974, 1992, 2004; Cambodia (Kampuchea), 1972, 1993; Cape 
Verde, 1980; Central African Republic, 1981, 1994, 2004; Chad, 1962; Congo, 1992; Congo, Democratic 
Republic Of (Zaire), 1964, 1978, 2003, 2005; Cote D'Ivoire, 2000; Djibouti, 1977; Equatorial Guinea, 
1968, 1991; Gabon, 1991; Guinea, 1990; Madagascar (Malagasy), 1992, 1998; Mali, 1974, 1992; 
Mauritania, 1961, 1978; Moldova, 1994; Mozambique, 2004; Nicaragua, 1987; Niger, 1996, 1999; Peru, 
1993; Romania, 1991; Rwanda, 1962; Rwanda, 2003; Senegal, 1963; Somalia, 1960; Togo, 1992; Yemen 
(Arab Republic Of Yemen), 1991. 
7   Nicaragua, 1987, Burundi, 1992; Central African Republic, 1994 and 2004; Bosnia Herzegovina, 1995; 
Rwanda, 2003. Many countries are starting to come to grips with the exact nature of the rights and 
obligations their international and domestic laws entail.  In many developing countries, 
national human rights commissions have been quite active in interpreting the nature of 
economic and social rights. Katarina Tomasevski estimates that 44.5 per cent of the 
FDVHORDGRI,QGRQHVLD¶V+XPDQ5LJKWV&RPPLVVLRQZDVLQFODVVLILHGDVµYLRODWLRQV
RIWKHULJKWWRZHOIDUH¶´
8 The inclusion of social rights ± to housing and healthcare for 
example, in the South African constitution has led to litigation in that country that has 
been moderately successful and demonstrates the plausibility of enforcing these rights in 
a court of law.
9 
 
Governments and stakeholders alike have a strong interest in clear understandings about 
the nature of their obligations under the ICESCR. The reporting system has been helpful 
in this respect, but it has been driven primarily by the agenda of the Committee and the 
States Parties. As is well-known, States are sometimes late with their reports and often 
not sufficiently self-critical in their reporting.
10 The submission of shadow reports is 
helpful, but there is still a risk that these periodic assessments become ritualized and 
formulaic. Allowing individuals to lodge complaints can be an important part of the 
process of gradually coming to a clearer understanding about what social and economic  
rights entail and what constitutes a good faith effort on the part of states parties to comply 
with their international legal obligations. The individual complaints mechanism is an 
important complement to the dialog between the oversight committee and each state 
party. 
 
First, individual complaints require the discussion of rights to move from abstract 
principles to concrete cases. It is difficult to define in the abstract what constitutes steps 
WDNHQ³WRWKHPD[LPXPRI>HDFKVWDWHVSDUW\¶V@DYDLODEOHUHVRXUFHV´
11 without a concrete 
LQVWDQFHLQZKLFKZKDWLV³DYDLODEOH´DQGZKDWDUHDVRQDEOH ³PD[LPXP´PLJKWEH%XW
in the limited set of cases in which concrete allegations have been litigated in national 
courts, some progress on these issues has been made.  In South Africa, concrete cases 
have led to rulings that the constitutional right to housing does not mean housing on 
demand, but rather it means a reasonable program to ensure emergency housing relief.  
Decisions taken by the Constitutional Court have held that reasonable programs must 
take into account specific resource limitations.
12 Discussion of cases brought by 
                                                 
8   .DWDULQD7RPDVHYVNL³Strengthening pro-poor laZ/HJDOHQIRUFHPHQWRIHFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDOULJKWV´ 
Located at 
http://www.odi.org.uk/rights/Publications/Rights%20Meeting%20Series%20Publication%202006/chapter2
_screen.pdf 
9  3LHWHUVH0DULXV³3RVVLELOLWLHVDQG3LWIDOOVLQWKH'RPHVWLF(QIRUFHPHQWRI6RFial Rights: Contemplating 
WKH6RXWK$IULFDQ([SHULHQFH´Human Rights Quarterly pp882-905. 
10  See Anne F. %D\HIVN\µ7KH8Q+XPDQ5LJKWV7UHDW\6\VWHP8QLYHUVDOLW\DWWKH&URVVURDGV¶ORFDWHGDW
http://www.yorku.ca/hrights. (visited _________) 
11    Para 4 of the Preamble to the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, G.A. Res. A/Res/63/117. 
12   Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, 11 BCLR 1169 (CC) (2000). See the 
discussion for example in Cass Sunstein:  Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do.(Oxford ; New 
York: Oxford University Press 2001)  individuals has largely vindicated the position that social and economic rights are 
justiciable,
13 though cases must be carefully crafted and expectations managed. 
 
Second, the individual complaint mechanism is an important form of civil society 
empowerment. It is a way to help interpret the law through the lives and experiences of 
living individuals. As an inductive means to understand the concerns of human beings, 
this process brings their issues to the table. More than any other source of policy review, 
the individual complaint process empowers the individual to name the particular 
deficiency and thereby help to set the agenda for addressing it. As a complement to State 
reporting, individual complaints could well put issues on the table that the back-and-forth 
between States and experts has neglected. 
 
Third, allowing individuals to register their complaints with the Committee could very 
well encourage the development and use of domestic mechanisms to deal with citizen 
complaints. $UWLFOHRIWKH23VWLSXODWHVWKDW³The Committee shall not consider a 
communication unless it has ascertained that all available domestic remedies have been 
H[KDXVWHG´
14  In some cases, public officials may decide to improve access to domestic 
remedies ± whether through the courts, ombudsmen procedures, or alternative forms of 
dispute resolution.  In any case, the necessity to exhaust domestic remedies will require 
individuals and groups to become much more informed about their State, their rights, and 
the interaction between the two. In many cases, they will learn about the limits as well as 
the possibilities for demanding attention to economic and social rights in their domestic 
context. 
   
As a consequence, the right of individuals to complain to the Committee is likely to 
contribute to a clearer consensus on the meaning of the obligations contained in the 
ICESCR.  Dealing inductively with cases as they arise in concrete circumstances ± after 
exhausting domestic remedies ± will contribute to the clarity of the rules over time.  The 
OHJLWLPDF\RIWKDWFRQVHQVXVZLOOEHHQKDQFHGE\WKH&RPPLWWHH¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRDGRSW
local perspectives, to understand local constraints, and to appreciate (as the Optional 
Protocol  requires) that there are PXOWLSOHSDWKVWRWKHIXOILOPHQWRIWKHWUHDW\¶V
obligations. Often, individuals will discover that they just do not have a case; their 
government is in fact fulfilling its obligations or at least making a good faith effort to do 
so. This is as it should be. Citizens will not only get a lesson on empowerment, they will 
also be educated in the limits of their claims as well. Ratification of the Optional Protocol 
FRXOGWKHUHIRUHFRQWULEXWHWRZKDWDJURZLQJOLWHUDWXUHWHUPV³WUDQVQDWLRQDOOHJDO
SURFHVVHV´in which interactions at multiple levels leads to norm internalization that in 
turn facilitates international law compliance generally.
15 
 
                                                 
13   See for example note 9 above and Yigen, Kristine: µ(QIRUFLQJ6RFLDO-XVWLFH(FRQRPLFDQG6RFLDO
5LJKWVLQ6RXWK$IULFD¶ 4(2) International Journal of Human Rights pp13-19. See also the cases 
(particularly that of Colombia) discussed in Malcolm Langford, Social Rights Jurisprudence [need the rest 
of the citation] 
14   See Article 3(1) of OP, note 11 above. 
15  See Hongju Harold Koh: µHow Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?¶ (1999) 74 (4) Indiana 
Law Journal pp1397-417 & Anne-Marie Slaughter: A New World Order. (Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press 2004). A number of sceptics, of course, do not think the OP holds such promise.
16 Some view 
the individual complaint mechanism as yet another example of the over-judicialization of 
human rights,
17 which is especially inappropriate, they argue, for economic and social 
rights.  They worry that litigation is not the answer to serious developmental issues, 
maintain that economic and social rights are not justiciable, and believe that the right of 
individuals to complain would divert attention and resources from the real problems 
governments face.  
 
It is patently obvious that no mechanism for complaining can compensate for severe 
resource constraints, corrupt and inefficient governments, or ill-conceived developmental 
plans. No one ± not even the Optional Protocol¶VPRVWDUGHQWVXSSRUWHUV± would suggest 
otherwise.  But crucially, the OP is a policy complement, not a substitute, for programs 
that address dire economic needs and social inequality. Furthermore, the idea that this 
agreement constitutes an example of over-legalization is mistaken. The characterization 
of some commentators to the contrary notwithstanding,
18 the OP is not a judicial or a 
litigatory mechanism in a strict sense.
19 TKH&RPPLWWHHLVQRWD³FRXUW´DQGWKH
SURFHGXUHVGHVFULEHGLQWKH23DUHQRWGHVLJQHGWRWDNHD³VWULFWYLRODWLRQLVW´
20 approach 
to the ICESCR.  The Committee is empowered to receive and consider 
³FRPPXQLFDWLRQV´
21 not charges.  If the Committee considers under exceptional 
circumstances that victims may suffer irreparable damages before it can consider the 
VLWXDWLRQLW³UHTXHVWV´
22 the State to take interim measures, it does not issue injunctions.  
&RPPXQLFDWLRQVDUHWREHWUDQVPLWWHG³FRQILGHQWLDOO\´
23 to the State Party and discussed 
LQ³FORVHGPHHWLQJV´
24 in contrast to public accusations and proceedings in a trial setting.  
The State Party responds to WKHFRPPXQLFDWLRQZLWK³FODULI\LQJ´VWDWHPHQWVQRWD
GHIHQVHEULHI0RVWLPSRUWDQWO\WKHLGHDLVWRVHWWOHWKHFRPSODLQWDPLFDEO\³ZLWKD
YLHZWRUHDFKLQJDIULHQGO\VHWWOHPHQW´
 25  ± not explicitly to find guilt or to punish an 
offender.  The CommitteHIROORZVXSLWVGLVFXVVLRQVE\WUDQVPLWWLQJLWV³YLHZV´DQG
³UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV´LIDQ\WRWKHSDUWLHVFRQFHUQHG
26 it does not render a verdict.  At the 
end of the day, the State Party concerned is not fined or imprisoned. The extent of its 
obligation is WR³JLYHGXHFRQVLGHUDWLRQWRWKHYLHZVRIWKH&RPPLWWHH´DQGSURYLGHD
                                                 
16  For a good summary of these and related concerns, see Dennis and Stewart  note 4 above. 
17  See /DXUHQFH5+HOIHU³2YHUOHJDOL]LQJ+XPDQ5LJKWV,QWHUQDWLRQDO5HODWLRQV7KHRU\DQGWKH
Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash against Human Rights RHJLPHV´ (2002) 102 Columbia Law Review 
pp1832-44. 
18  See in particular Dennis and Stewart (note 4 above). 
19   Some legal scholars have identified an individual right of complaint as a key ingredient in rendering any 
quasi-DGMXGLFDWLYHLQVWLWXWLRQPRUH³FRXUWOLNH´See Laurence R. Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter: 
³7RZDUGD7KHRU\RI(IIHFWLYH6XSUDQDWLRQDO$GMXGLFDWLRQ´Yale Law Journal 107 pp273-
391.This certainly need not be the case, however, and the OP to the ICESCR is designed to avoid the 
trappings of judicialization. 
20   This term is used by Dennis and Stewart  note 4 above. 
21   See 11 above, Article 1(1) 
22   Ibid, Article 5(1) 
23   Ibid,  Article 6(1) 
24   Ibid, Article 8(1) 
25   Ibid, Article 7. 
26   Ibid, Article 9(1). written response within six months.
27  7KDW¶VLW$QG\HWRSSRQHQWVRIWKH23ZRUU\
DERXW³RYHUUHDFKLQJOHJDOSRVLWLYLVP´
 28 and frame the entire project as one of ambitious 
judicialization.  Perhaps to the chagrin of some NGOs, States parties were quite careful 
not WRFUHDWHDFRXUWRQ³YLRODWLRQVW´SUHPLVHVWRUHQGHUYHUGLFWVRQWKHYLRODWLRQRI
economic, social and cultural rights. 
 
With this in mind, we should clear away some misunderstandings.  The protocol does not 
substitute the decision of an international court for local legislative decision making.  
([WHUQDOHQIRUFHPHQWVLQFHWKHUHLVQRQHZLOOQRWXQGHUPLQHWKHVHULJKWV¶VWDWXUHDQG
acceptability. ³/LWLJDWLRQ´ZLOOQRWcrowd out other approaches, since the process of 
communication outlined in the protocol is not designed to supplant local approaches to 
local economic and social issues, but rather to complement them. The idea that the 
optional protocol represents over-legalization run amok is a contorted caricature of the 
Protocol.  
 
Once we correctly understand that we are not in the world of litigation, but instead in the 
world of communication and persuasion, many of the arguments against ratification of 
the Optional Protocol lose their bite.  The whole debate over the justiciability of the 
progressive realization of rights is far less ominous when the purpose is dialog and 
SHUVXDVLRQUDWKHUWKDQ³VWULFWYLRODWLRQLVP´7KHFRQFHUQVWKDWVWDQGDUGVIRUFRPSOLDQFH
with the ICESCR are not currently very precise
29 miss the point that improving shared 
understandings of these standards is what the individual complaints process is designed to 
do, in a non-litigious mode. Nor is the debate over the justiciability of economic/social 
rights versus civil/political rights ± urgent, perhaps, in the domestic context ± of central 
importance in the decision to ratify the OP.
30  Hundreds of pages have been written about 
whether the ICESCR will now be expected to be implemented immediately and in toto, 
RQSDLQRIWKH&RPPLWWHH¶V³YLHZ´WKDWDState party has failed to do so. Instead, the 
individual complaint process can and ought to focus on what constitutes reasonable 
progress in implementing these rights.
31 
 
The focus on litigiousness has obscured an important aspect of individual complaints to 
the international community: these complaints can complement and support broader 
domestic social movements to prod governments to change public policies and priorities.  
The most important consequences of significant cases will not so much be the formal 
findings, but the inspiration the case provides to groups, coalitions, and social movements 
                                                 
27   Ibid, Article 9(2).  
28   See Dennis and Stewart 2004 note 4 above. 
29   Ibid.  
30   The debate is well encapsulated in a recent pair of articles.  See James L. Cavallaro, and Emily J 
6FKDIIHU³/HVVDV0RUH5HWKLQNLQJ6XSUDQDWLRQDO/LWLJDWLRQRI(FRQRPLFDQG6RFLDO5LJKWVLQWKH
AmerLFDV´-2005) 56 Hastings Law Journal  who argue that there are fundamental differences 
between these clusters of rights that should inform the framing of litigation and 7DUD-0HOLVK³5HWKLQNLQJ
The "Less as More" Thesis: Supranational Litigation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the 
$PHULFDV´New York University Journal of international Law & Politics pp171-342, who argues 
that such distinctions can actually be counterproductive to the advancement of human rights. 
31   This seems to be the approach of the Constitutional Court in South Africa, for example, in the 
Grootboom case, where the court required reasonable programs with careful attention to limited budgets. 
Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, 11 BCLR 1169 (CC) (2000). to press an issue forward on multiple fronts.  Indeed, far from being an alternative to 
³OHJLWLPDWHSROLWLFDOSURFHVVHV´
32 the publicity surrounding individual complaints can be 
used to bolster them.  A finding that the government has not lived up to its obligations 
ZRXOGDGGDWOHDVWDELWRIZHLJKWWRSHRSOH¶VGHPDQGVWKDWWKHLUJRYHUQPHQWWDNH
economic and social deprivation and discrimination seriously.  It could certainly be 
useful for framing demands to governments and legislatures.  These cases should provide 
inputs into domestic political processes, not replace those processes. 
 
B. WILL RATIFICATION MATTER?  EVIDENCE FROM THE ICCPR 
 
³:HVHHQRFRQYLQFLQJHYLGHQFHWKDWDOHJDOO\ELQGLQJDGMXGLFDWLYHPHFKDQLVPZRXOG
OHDGWRJUHDWHUFRPSOLDQFHE\VWDWHVZLWKWKH,&(6&5REOLJDWLRQV´
33  This section will 
provide such evidence.  With the caveat that it is iPSRVVLEOHWRSURYHDQLQVWLWXWLRQ¶V
empirical consequences before it has been established, and with the further caveat, as I 
have argued above, that the protocol is not strictly speaking an adjudicative mechanism, 
this section argues that such evidence is not only available, it is suggestive of salutary 
consequences for the individual right to complain.  This section shows that ratification of 
the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR is in fact associated with improvements in the civil 
rights practices in the countries that have ratified.  There are good reasons to think that a 
similar process stands a chance of improving rights outcomes in the area of social, 
economic, and cultural rights as well.   
 
The closest we can come to understanding the effect of WKH,&(6&5¶V2ptional Protocol 
LVWRORRNDWDQDQDORJRXVFRPPLWPHQWWKH,&&35¶VILUVWRSWLRQDOSURWRFRO+RZ
³VXFFHVVIXO´KDVWKDWSURYLVLRQEHHQ":KLOHWKHUHKDVEHHQPXFKVSHFXODWLRQDQGDIHZ
VSHFWDFXODUFDVHVLQZKLFKWKHDEXVHRIWKH,&&35¶VLQGividual complaint process has 
backfired,
34 practically no systematic evidence has been brought to bear on this question. 
To what extent has an OP commitment to the ICCPR influenced the quality of civil rights 
among its signatories?  Certainly we can think of theoretical reasons that the OP might 
have positive effects on civil rights: States may try to improve their practices 
preemptively, anticipating the possibility of closer scrutiny touched off by the complaints 
of an individual;
35 State officials might improve their practices in direct response to 
discussions with and/or views of the HRC; or, State policy changes might be a much 
                                                 
32  7KH&RPPLWWHH¶V*HQHUDO&RPPHQWVDFNQRZOHGJHWKDWWKHUHDOL]DWLRQRIHFRQRPLFVRFLDODQGFXOWXUDO
rights require domestic implementation through legislation, administrative decision and reform, and 
budgetary measures, and other measures; not fiat from a committee of external experts. See the discussion 
in Dennis and Stewart  note 4 above. 
33  Dennis and Stewart note 4 above.  This and similar statements elsewhere in the literature on the effects 
of international human rights agreements cites research by 2RQD+DWKDZD\³'R+XPDQ5LJKWV7UHDWLHV
Make a Difference"´Yale Law Journal  pp1935-2042.  New research suggests there are likely 
to be much more positive consequences to international human rights treaties.  See for example Gray, Mark 
00LNL&DXO.LWWLOVRQDQG:D\QH6DQGKROW]³:RPHQDQG*ORbalization: A Study of 180 Countries, 
1975±´International Organization pp293-333  and Simmons  (note 5 above).   
34 Helfer (note 17 above). 
35  Malcolm Langford and Jeff King cite the example of WKH,&&35¶V2SWLRQDO3URWRFRODVHQFRXUDJLQJthe 
Australian High Court to anticipate and incorporate international law in interpreting local common law.:  
See  Malcolm Langford and Jeff A. King, ³Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: past 
3UHVHQWDQG)XWXUH´S514 more complex response to the increased salience of a broader social movement that may 
have inspired the case in the first place.  In short, there are a number of ways individual 
complaints might have effects that do not require the fist of centralized enforcement from 
the international community. 
 
To proceed, we need a measure of civil liberties. Freedom House, a non-profit and non-
governmental organization, has compiled civil liberties scores ranging from 1 to 7 based 
on a broad range of subcomponents,
36 and which parallels many of the basic requirements 
of the ICCPR. I develop a model that is extraordinarily stringent. Ordinary least squares 
are used,
37 pooling observations both across cases and over time, with the ³county-\HDU´
as the unit of analysis. In every case, the dependent variable is change in actual civil 
liberties since the previous year. Positive coefficients therefore indicate improvements in 
civil liberties from year to year. In order to control for the baseline from which change is 
measured, I include a lagged measure of the level of civil liberties in the previous period.  
Because there are a range of possible explanations for civil liberties that vary by country 
or region, but not across time, country fixed effects
38 are included in every specification.  
Thus any differences reported in civil liberties correspond to changes within countries 
over time, and not to differences among countries themselves.  
 
But how can we distinguish the effects of ratifying the Optional Protocol on actual human 
rights, when the root cause might be some factor that explains both ratification and civil 
liberties improvements? Governments might have improved their practices, whether or 
not they have ratified a treaty obligating them to do so. I account for this possibility by 
using instrumental variables
39 to model the decision to ratify the Optional Protocol in the 
first place.  I use a two stage approach, in which all of the variables that explain the 
behavioral outcome are used to estimate the first-stage ratification decision. This 
                                                 
36   The complete checklist can be accessed at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2000/methodology3.htm (accessed 15 July 2003). The 
measure considers freedom of the media to express ideas, (ICCPR, Article 19(2)) free religious 
expression(ICCPR , Article 18(1), Article 27.),  freedom of assembly (ICCPR Article 21.),  independent 
judiciary (ICCPR, Article 14(1)), equal protection of the laws (ICCPR, Articles 14(3), 26), protection from 
unjustified imprisonment and torture (ICCPR Article 7, 9(1).), freedom of movement (ICCPR Article 12.), 
equal rights in marriage (ICCPR Article 23).
36  Freedom House does use a broader set of considerations in 
addition to those with specific parallels in the treaty.  For example, they consider trade unions and 
collective bargaining, freedom from war and insurgencies, freedom from extreme government indifference 
and corruption, and freedom from indoctrination by the state, none of which are explicitly addressed in the 
ICCPR.  Nonetheless, there is a high degree of overlap.  The civil liberties indicator parallels reasonably 
closely the spirit of the civil protections enumerated in the ICCPR. 
37   An instrumental variable ordered probit model would have been preferable given the categorical nature 
of the data (changes in the civil liberties index are typically though not exclusively 0s and 1s) but a two-
stage ordered probit model would not converge when including country fixed effects.  I made the decision 
to retain the fixed effects and use ordinary least squares regression.   
38  These are columns of dummy variables (1 or 0) that distinguish one country from another over time. 
39  The instruments I use are:  regional OP ratification density, domestic ratification processes (the 
constitutional ratification hurdle and whether or not the legal system is based on common law), and the 
coXQWU\¶VOHJDOKHULWDJHZKHWKHULWLVDFRPPRQRUFLYLOODZV\VWHP7hese variables influence 
ratification, but they bear no significant relationship with the rights outcomes of interest here.  See the more 
elaborate justification provided in Simmons forthcoming.   approach helps us to estimate the effects of ratification, once we have accounted for all of 
those factors which explain ratification in the first place.   
 
Of course, many factors can make it more or less likely that a government will expand or 
contract the civil liberties offered to its citizens. Many of these are reflected in the control 
variables. (Note that all variables are defined in the Data Appendix.)  One of the most 
important controls is the level of civil liberties in the previous period. Extremely liberal 
governments naturally have less room to improve than more restrictive ones. The better 
the existing practices, the less likely we are to see improvements. Another control is 
change in the quality of democracy itself. Controlling for the level of democracy makes 
for a very conservative test of our primary hypothesis about the role of WKH,&&35¶V23
This specification refuses to credit treaty ratification with improved civil liberties 
protection, when that credit should go to the broader processes of democratization that we 
have witnessed over the course of the past two decades. Similarly, I control for domestic 
efforts to bring governmental abuses out into the open and under control by including 
HDFKFRXQWU\¶VH[SHULHQFHZLWKGRPHVWLFWUXWKFRPPLVVLRQVDQGWKHXVHRIFULPLQDO
human rights trials.  It is very likely that a government willing to prosecute or to expose 
DEXVHVRIWKHSDVWLVLWVHOIPRUHOLNHO\WRUHVSHFWLWVFLWL]HQ¶VFLYLOULJKWV 
 
Two other variables also capture the broad processes of transition and democratization 
and their possibly contagious nature. I include the OHYHORIFLYLOOLEHUWLHVLQDFRXQWU\¶V
region in the previous period as a potential influence. It is very plausible that liberties 
diffuse from country to country directly as citizens observe the practices of their near 
neighbors and come to expect similar freedoms from their own governments. I also 
include year dummies for the transition years from the Cold War to the Post-Cold War 
periods (1990 and 1991). These were certainly years of commonly experienced shocks 
associated with civil rights liberalization. While the ideals of the ICCPR may have in fact 
inspired some of the changes of this period, the specifications below control for the 
widespread liberalizations associated with the end of the Cold War.  In short, if there are 
any positive effects associated with ratification of the ICCPR, they are not being driven 
by these transition years alone.  
 
Other control variables include civil wars, which are notoriously associated with the 
degeneration in civil liberties when governments perceive their natioQ¶VVHFXULW\WREHDW
stake. This is a simple dichotomous measure of whether a country was embroiled in a 
civil war or not during the year in question. ,DOVRFRQWUROIRUDFRXQWU\¶VGHJUHHRIVRFLDO
heterogeneity, since it is not unlikely that governments in more heterogeneous social 
settings use their power to favor some groups and to repress others. This is the log of the 
FRPELQHGPHDVXUHRIUHOLJLRXVODQJXDJHDQGHWKQLF³IUDFWLRQDOL]DWLRQ´
40 This variable 
does not vary over time. The greater the total fractionalization in a given society, the 
more repressive we might expect the government to be. And finally, I consider the 
influence of external providers of development assistance. Because most of this aid 
comes from the more liberal democracies, there is a possibility that aid dependence is 
                                                 
40  Each component of this measure captures the likelihood that any two individuals drawn randomly from 
the population will be from the same religious, language, or ethnic group.  They are totaled, and the log of 
the sum (plus one) is taken to reduce the influence of extreme outliers. associated with improved civil liberties over time. Whether this might be due to 
conditional aid or subtler processes of socialization and learning, aid dependence is 
expected to be positively associated with improvements in civil liberties.   
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
7KHUHVXOWVRIWKHVHWHVWVDUHUHSRUWHGLQ7DEOH5DWLILFDWLRQRIWKH,&&35¶VOptional 
Protocol may have some effect on civil liberties, but as we might expect, it is hardly the 
only or even the strongest effect among the factors considered here. These results suggest 
that the right of an individual to complain to the HRC about an ICCPR violation is 
associated with a .09 increase in the 7 point civil rights scale.  Certainly this is not a huge 
effect, but it is detectably better than no effect at all. The scale of the effect can be 
compared to the effect of criminal prosecutions for human rights abuses (which are 
estimated to be associated with an improvement of .12 on the scale) and a domestic truth 
commission, which delivers (with somewhat high confidence) an improvement in civil 
liberties about three times higher.
41   
 
All of the control variables behaved as expected, and most were highly statistically 
significant. Certainly, the previous level of civil rights strongly predicts changes in the 
opposite direction. 7KHEHWWHUWKHSUDFWLFHVLQDFRXQWU\¶VUHJLRQRQDYHUDJHWKHPRUH
OLNHO\DJRYHUQPHQWLWVHOILVWRLPSURYHLWVRZQFLYLOOLEHUWLHV$FKDQJHLQDFRXQWU\¶V
level of democracy in the previous period is almost certainly likely to result in improved 
civil liberties in the next, as is overseas development assistance as a proportion of GDP. 
The transition years marking the end of the Cold War (1990-1991) were clearly 
associated with civil liberties improvements compared to all other years.  
 
We can conclude that there is some HYLGHQFHWKDWUDWLILFDWLRQRIWKH,&&35¶VOptional 
Protocol has made some difference in the likelihood that civil liberties will improve in the 
ratifying country, subject to some caveats. Despite the inclusion of many variables that 
represent processes that unfold over time, it is hard to tell whether there still may be some 
time-dependent process that is associated with both ICCPR ratification and civil liberties 
improvements.
 42 While these results are suggestive of a positive relationship between 
ratification and improvements in a broad measure of civil liberties, they should be 
interpreted cautiously. Of course, different variables in addition to ratification of the OP 
are likely to explain economic, social and cultural rights, including various measures of 
development and economic and bureaucratic capacity. Still, there is some evidence to 
suggest that the individual complaints mechanism of the ICCPR is associated with 
modest improvements in civil liberties, controlling for many other possible explanations.  
 
                                                 
41  Note however, that while treaty ratification is endogenous in this model, truth commissions are not.  So 
it is not clear what advantage truth commissions would deliver above and beyond the conditions which 
were associated with setting them up in the first place.   
42  For example, when a time trend is included, it disturbs these results by increasing greatly the ICCPR 
standard errors (making it harder than ever to tell whether there is a relationship).  Furthermore, the results 
are also weakened significantly when year fixed effects are included. C. RATIFICATION AND EMULATION: WHY EVEN COUNTRIES WITH DOMESTIC 
ESC RIGHTS GUARANTEES SHOULD RATIFY THE PROTOCOL 
 
I have argued above that ratification of WKH,&(6&5¶V23ZLOOSXWQHZLVVXHVLPSRUWDQW
to individuals on the table for discussion and that this process could very well have 
salutary effects in those countries.  But why should a country that has already made 
ample provisions in its own law for economic, social and political rights ratify?  Surely in 
countries already in substantive compliance with the treaty ratification will make little 
difference to the quality of life and the security of rights for individuals within those 
countries.  There are still good reasons, however, for States in compliance to ratify the 
OP:  it will encourage other States to do so.  Emulation effects could very well contribute 
to a virtuous spiral in which rights leaders ratify, others follow their example, the dialog 
oYHULQGLYLGXDO¶VFRPSODLQWVEHJLQVH[SHFWDWLRQVFRQYHUJHORFDOSROLWLFDOSUHVVXUHIRU
compliance increases, and responsible government agencies and legislatures consider 
their policy alternatives in the light of new interpretive information about the legitimate 
range of ways a state may fulfil its international legal obligations.   
 
But do States really emulate the ratification decisions of others?
43  Once again, we can 
turn to analogous treaty provisions for evidence. Four important human rights 
conventions ± the ICCPR, the CERD, the CEDAW, and the CAT ± have optional 
protocols or complaint procedures analogous to that of the ICESCR.
44 Only the ICCPR 
                                                 
43   There is a burgeoning literature on policy diffusion that explores ± quantitatively and qualitatively ± the 
various mechanisms that explain this observed tendency for states to adopt policies that have been adopted 
by others.  For a recent review of the literature and some empirical tests, see Simmons, et al.  The Global 
Diffusion of Markets and Democracy. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008).   
44   2SWLRQDO3URWRFRO,RIWKH,&&35IRUH[DPSOHVSHFLILHVWKDW³$6WDWH3DUW\WRWKH&RYHQDQWWKDW
becomes a party to the present Protocol recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and 
consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation 
by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant. No communication shall be received by 
WKH&RPPLWWHHLILWFRQFHUQVD6WDWH3DUW\WRWKH&RYHQDQWZKLFKLVQRWDSDUW\WRWKHSUHVHQW3URWRFRO«´
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302, entered into force March 
23, 1976. For a discussion of how this mechanism works see De Zayas, et al. "Application of the ICCPR 
under the Optional Protocol by the Human Rights Committee" (1985) 28 German Yearbook of 
International Law pp 9-64. The Optional Protocol of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination Against Women provides that  ³$6WDWH3DUW\WRWKHSUHVHQW3URWRFRO«UHFRJQL]HVthe 
FRPSHWHQFHRIWKH&RPPLWWHHRQWKH(OLPLQDWLRQRI'LVFULPLQDWLRQDJDLQVW:RPHQ«WRUHFHLYHDQG
FRQVLGHUFRPPXQLFDWLRQV«VXEPLWWHGE\RURQEHKDOIRILQGLYLGXDOVRUJURXSVRILQGLYLGXDOVXQGHUWKH
jurisdiction of a State Party, claiming to be victims of a violation of any of the rights set forth in the 
&RQYHQWLRQE\WKDW6WDWH3DUW\´$UWLFOHVDQG2SWLRQDO3URWRFROWRWKH&RQYHQWLRQRQWKH(OLPLQDWLRQ
of Discrimination against Women, G.A. res. 54/4, annex, 54 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 5, U.N. Doc. 
A/54/49 (Vol. I) (2000), entered into force Dec. 22, 2000.  In the case of the CERD, a similar option is 
VSHOOHGRXWLQ$UWLFOHZKLFKUHDGV³$6WDWH3DUW\PD\DWDQ\WLPHGHFODUHWKDWLWUHFRJQL]HVWKH
competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals or groups of 
individuals within its jurisdiction claiming to be victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the 
ULJKWVVHWIRUWKLQWKLV&RQYHQWLRQ«´$UWLFOH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RQYHQWLRQRQWKH(OLPLQDWLRQRI$Ol Forms 
of Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969.  Similarly, the CAT contains a 
SURYLVLRQIRURSWLRQDOO\HVWDEOLVKLQJVXFKDQREOLJDWLRQ$FFRUGLQJWR$UWLFOH³$6WDWH3DUW\WRWKLV
Convention may at any time declare under this article that it recognizes the competence of the Committee 
to receive and consider communications from or on behalf of individuals subject to its jurisdiction who contains the further option of committing to allow other States to lodge violation 
complaints with the Human Rights Committee (though it has never been exercised).
45 By 
H[DPLQLQJJRYHUQPHQWV¶ZLOOLQJQHVVWRWDNHRQFRPPLWPHQWVWKDWSURJUHVVLYHO\H[SRVH
them to greater authoritative external scrutiny, we can test the proposition that States tend 
to emulate one DQRWKHU¶VUDWLILFDWLRQGHFLVLRQV 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
I use what is called a hazard model to test for the factors that significantly raise the 
probability that a State will ratify one of these optional obligations in any given year, 
given that it has not yet done so. The explanatory variables raise (or lower) the 
SURSRUWLRQDWH´ULVN´RU´KD]DUG´WKDWDState will ratify. Strictly speaking, this hazard 
model analyzes time to ratification, taking into account that some States will never ratify. 
The HIIHFWV,UHSRUWDUHFDOOHG³KD]DUGUDWLRV´ Factors that raise the relative likelihood of 
ratification take on hazard ratios greater than one; those that reduce the likelihood, less 
than one. We are interested in the hypothesis that the more SWDWHVZLWKLQDFRXQWU\¶V
region ratify one of these Optional Protocols (that is, the greater the density of ratification 
within a SWDWH¶VUHJLRQWKHPRUHOLNHO\DState itself is to do so. In other words, the 
hypothesis is that the more States within the region ratify, the more a country feels 
pressure ± whether moral or political ± to do so as well (controlling for other obvious 
influences). 
 
Table 2 shows that emulation of neighboring SWDWHV¶UDWLILFDWLRQEHKDYLRULVVWURQJ
Breaking up the world into nine regions (defined by the World Bank), the densities of 
ratification within those regions is a fairly reliable predictor of a given countr\¶s 
ratification. The hazard ratios are all positive and statistically significant (except for the 
case of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women). Every 
percentage point increase in the proportion of SWDWHVZLWKLQRQH¶VRZQUHJLRQLQFUHDVHV
the likelihood that others will also ratify ± for the ICCPR, by 1.8%, for the CERD by 
34%, and for the CAT by about 4%.  We can be between 91% certain (for the CAT) and 
99.8% certain (for the ICCPR) that these relationships are not likely to have been 
generated by chance alone. Strong regional effects for ratification of individual complaint 
mechanisms obtain even we control for the influence of the quality and stability of 
democracy, the tradition of the local legal system, whether the government in power can 
EHFRQVLGHUHG³OHIWOHDQLQJ´DQGFRQWUROOLQJIRUVL]HDQGZHDOWKRIthe country. 
Governments look to others in their region for signs of what is appropriate and expected.  
They often know their reputations will be judged in comparison to others in their region.  
                                                                                                                                                 
claim to be victims of a violation by a State Party of the provisions of the ConYHQWLRQ´*$UHV
annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), entered into force June 26, 1987. 
45  7KLVRSWLRQLVFRQWDLQHGLQ$UWLFOH³$6WDWH3DUW\WRWKHSUHVHQW&RYHQDQWPD\DWDQ\WLPHGHFODUH
under this article that it recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider 
communications to the effect that a State Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its 
obligations under the present Covenant. Communications under this article may be received and considered 
only if submitted by a State Party which has made a declaration recognizing in regard to itself the 
competence of the Committee. No communication shall be received by the Committee if it concerns a State 
Party which has not made suFKDGHFODUDWLRQ«´*$UHV$;;,81*$256XSS1RDW
52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976. 7KLV³GHPRQVWUDWLRQHIIHFW´FDQEHHQFRXUDJHGLIVRPHStates take a leadership position 
and ratify the Optional Protocol.  As I have argued in the section above, there is a good 
chance the added scrutiny and the enhanced dialog about rights themselves will nudge 
policies in a positive direction. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This essay, rather than concentrating on a legal analysis of the ICESCR and the Optional 
Protocol, has argued in a consequentialist vein that it might help. No one can say for sure, 
but the Optional Protocol invites new issues ± important to actual human beings who live 
daily with their perceived injustices and deprivations ± to be put on the table for 
discussion. As many have done, I have taken the position that such discussions have the 
potential to encourage better understandings of what the ICESCR requires. Unlike many, 
KRZHYHU,GRQRWVHHWKLVDVDQH[DPSOHRIWKH³MXGLFLDOL]DWLRQ´RIKXPDQULJKWV,QGHHG
there is some prospect that the Committee will learn of some of the limits and frustrations 
of States in their attempts to comply with their obligations as much as they promulgate 
WKHLURZQ³YLHZV´These cases could help shape expectations about the meaning of the 
treaty. This is especially important where there a lingering perception that economic, 
social and cultural rights are not justiciable.
46 
 
Alarmists worry that the Committee will engage in over-reach; others may be concerned 
WKDWDFWLYLVWVZLOODEXVHWKHFRPSODLQWSURFHVVWRIRUFHJRYHUQPHQWV¶KDQGVLQDQ
unproductive way that does nothing but produce backlash. Some reflection should suffice 
to conclude that these concerns are probably overdrawn. Human rights advocates want 
rights to improve. 0DQ\KDYHFRPHWRUHDOL]HWKDW³litigation strategies that are not linked 
to other forms of pressure rarely achieve major impact and often are irrelevant in a way 
that undermines the strength of supranational judicial bodies."
47 Governments also have 
incentives to support improvements; empirical work has shown that higher productivity 
levels are associated with the better provision of certain economic and social rights.
48  
Moreover, the Committee has no incentive to make ridiculous demands that states parties 
are in no position to implement.
49 Their influence depends on maintaining the respect of 
governments.
50 Without that respect, their own legitimacy ± their sole source of power - 
will be undermined. The ICESCR itself and the history of its drafting clearly 
                                                 
46   Research in specific country contexts suggests the assumption that social, economic and cultural rights 
are non-justiciable is not very well founded.  See Pieterse (note 9 above) with respect to South Africa and 
Melish (note 30 above) with respect to Latin America. 
47  Cavallaro and Schaffer  note 30 above. 
48   See /RUHQ]%OXPHDQG6WHIDQ9RLJW³7KH(FRQRPLF(IIHFWVRI+XPDQ5LJKWV´In Fachbereich 
Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge, 41. Kassel: Kassel UNIVERSITÄT   
49   Nor do they have the authority, as it is broadly understood that the ICESCR requires progressive 
implementation.  Article 2(1). 
50  This is a point made by many analysts,  see for example Cavallaro and Schaffer ,note 10 above, at 220.  
More broadly there is a significant literature on strategic judges which suggests that they are motivated to 
render decisions that have some probability of being complied with, not over-ruled, and not frustrated by 
other governmental bodies. See for example Garrett, et al.: "The European Court of Justice, National 
Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union".(1998) 52 International Organization pp 149-
76.1998, Spiller and Gely 1992. While I have argued the OP is not a judicial process, the general findings 
of this literature should assuage to  some extent concerns that the Committee will ask states to do the 
impossible.   acknowledge that compliance with the treaty is consistent with a broad range of 
developmental philosophies, strategies, and social/political systems.
51 
 
There is some reason to believe that empowering individuals to complain might nudge 
governments to take economic social and cultural rights more seriously. Evidence from 
WKH,&&35VXJJHVWVWKDWUDWLILFDWLRQRIWKDWWUHDW\¶VDQDORJRXV2ptional Protocol is 
associated with improvements with a broad measure of civil rights.
52 We should have no 
illusions, however, that such results will be easy or automatic. In particular, no one 
should expect ratification of the Optional Protocol to make a big dent in the kinds of 
indicators cited at the beginning of this essay. As put by Mark Malloch Brown, ³you 
cannot legislate good health and jobs. You need an economy strong enough to provide 
them´ (UNDP, 2000: iii). Neither the Optional Protocol nor the ICESCR for that matter is 
a substitute for a reasonable development policy. But development also requires a 
JRYHUQPHQWDFFRXQWDEOHIRUWKHGLVWULEXWLRQDOGHFLVLRQVLWPDNHVZLWKDVRFLHW\¶V
resources. Ratification of the Optional Protocol is a modest step in that direction, and 
governments should be encouraged to ratify.    
 
                                                 
51  Alston and Quinn ,note 4 above. 
52  Others have made the argument that coherence requires a holistic approach to the entire panoply of 
human rights.  See for example Rolf .QQHPDQQ³$&RKHUHQW$SSURDFKWR+XPDQ5LJKWV´
Human Rights Quarterly, pp323-42. 
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Social and Cultural Rights, Part ITable 1: 
Effect of ICCPR Optional Protocol Ratification on Civil Liberties Improvements (positive change) 
Instrumental Variable Regression 
Regression coefficients (p-values) 
  Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5  Model 7 
Optional protocol 
obligation 
(t-1) 
.099* 
(p=.067) 
.092* 
(p=.074) 
.093* 
(p=.068) 
.090* 
(p=.097) 
.083 
(p=.127) 
.087 
(p=.119) 
Civil liberties level 
(t-1) 
-.214*** 
(p=.000) 
-.217*** 
(p=.000) 
-.217*** 
(p=.000) 
-.233*** 
(p=.000) 
-.236*** 
(p=.000) 
-.241*** 
(p=.000) 
Civil liberties in region (t-
1) 
.117** 
(p=.018) 
.188*** 
(p=.001) 
.114** 
(p=.023) 
.113*** 
(p=.008) 
.059 
(p=.268) 
.116** 
(p=.034) 
Democratic improvement  
(t-1) 
.021*** 
(p=.001) 
.020*** 
(p=.002) 
.020*** 
(p=.002) 
.019*** 
(p=.003) 
.018*** 
(p=.005) 
.019*** 
(p=.004) 
Civil war  -.190*** 
(p=.001) 
-.188*** 
(p=.001) 
-.192*** 
(p=.000) 
-.222*** 
(p=.000) 
-.231*** 
(p=.001) 
-.241*** 
(p=.000) 
Fractionalization  -.521** 
(p=.031) 
-.562** 
(p=.021) 
-.559** 
(p=.021) 
.288*** 
(p=.004) 
.571*** 
(p=.001) 
.324*** 
(p=.002) 
Criminal trials  --  .130* 
(p=.053) 
.129* 
(p=.052) 
.127* 
(p=.074) 
.134* 
(p=.070) 
.130* 
(p=.080) 
Domestic truth 
commission 
.282*** 
(p=.007) 
.266** 
(p=.012) 
.268** 
(p=.012) 
.271** 
(p=.012) 
.267** 
(p=.011) 
.265** 
(p=.015) 
1990  .245*** 
(p=.009) 
.244*** 
(p=.087) 
.245*** 
(p=.009) 
.256*** 
(p=.009) 
.252*** 
(p=.007) 
.247*** 
(p=.010) 
1991  .110* 
(p=.094) 
.113* 
(p=.083) 
.114* 
(p=.081) 
.131* 
(p=.053) 
.136** 
(p=.043) 
.119* 
(p=.085) 
Human Rights 
Commission member 
--  --  .021 
(p=.506) 
--  --  -- 
Economic growth rate  --  --  --  .001  --  -- (p=.659) 
Trade share in GDP  --  --  --  --  .002** 
(p=.042) 
-- 
Overseas Development 
Aid/GDP (logged), t-1 
--  --  --  --  --  .591 
(p=.191) 
Number of countries  128  128  128  127  127  127 
Number of observations  2308  2308  2308  2135  2094  2111 
R-squared  .143  .145  .146  .162  .175  .169 
*=significant at .10 level  **=significant at .05 level  ***=significant at .01 level 
Note: country fixed effects included but not reported here. 
Based on robust standard errors, clustering on country. 
Note: includes only states that have rtified the ICCPR. 
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Table 2:  Recognition of International Authority to Rule on Complaints 
Cox proportionate hazard model 
 
Explanatory 
Variables: 
State-to-state 
right of 
complaint: 
Individual RigKWRI&RPSODLQW« 
ICCPR 
Art 41 
ICCPR 
OP I 
CERD 
Art. 14 
CAT 
Art. 22 
CEDAW 
OP 
Regional 
Ratifications 
1.02* 
(p=.095) 
1.018*** 
(p=.002) 
1.34** 
(p=.016) 
1.04* 
(p=.09) 
.995 
(p=.777) 
Democratic 
since WW1 
2.55 
(p=.11) 
3.58*** 
(p=.026) 
6.34** 
(p=.032) 
2.95 
(p=.17) 
5.81** 
(p=.011) 
Democratic 
Since WW2 
.976 
(p=.973) 
2.45* 
(p=.089) 
4.45** 
(p=.04) 
1.51 
(p=.55) 
6.99** 
(p=.012) 
Newly 
Transitioned 
Democracy 
1.58 
(p=.482) 
3.28*** 
(p=.000) 
1.90 
(p=.353) 
4.88*** 
(p=.005) 
4.64*** 
(p=.040) 
British Legal 
Heritage 
.529 
(p=.181) 
.509* 
(p=.065) 
 
.119*** 
(p=.001) 
.458* 
(p=.081) 
.538 
(p=.332) 
Left 
Government 
--  2.03*** 
(p=.007) 
--  1.72 
(p=.17) 
-- 
Log GDP  1.16 
(p=.147) 
.806*** 
(p=.004) 
1.07 
(p=.613) 
1.21* 
(p=.062) 
.938 
(p=.457) 
GDP/capita  1.00 
(p=.92) 
1.00 
(p=.26) 
.999 
(p=.168) 
1.0001* 
(p=.056) 
1.00 
(p=.983) 
#of countries  149  134  144  149  148 
#of 
ratifications 
37  70  29  35  27 
#of 
observations 
3677  2097  3465  1854  423 
Prob >chi2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
* significant at the .10 level  ** significant at the .05 level  ***significant at the .01 level 
 
 
 
 